Missile and drone attacks on the kingdom’s infrastructure are testing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s promise of security and prosperity. As Washington weighs nuclear cooperation, it must consider not only safeguards against proliferation, but also who could control Saudi nuclear capabilities decades from now.
Attacks expose strategic vulnerabilities
Mohammed bin Salman has built his rule on the promise that a modernized Saudi Arabia would also be safer and more prosperous. That promise is now under unprecedented strain.
Repeated missile and drone attacks have targeted Saudi airfields, threatened the kingdom’s oil-processing hub at Abqaiq and forced the shutdown of the East–West pipeline, the strategic route intended to bypass Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The latest attacks on Riyadh’s international airport have brought the war to the capital, exposing limits in the kingdom’s defenses and the vulnerability of its economic ambitions.
The crown prince retains firm control over the security establishment, faces no organized domestic opposition capable of challenging his rule and commands substantial financial resources. But his unprecedented concentration of power has made him the indispensable center of the Saudi system—and increasingly tied the system’s fortunes to his own.
Uranium enrichment raises questions beyond technical safeguards
Against this backdrop, Washington is moving forward with a nuclear cooperation agreement that could allow uranium enrichment on Saudi soil. Debate has focused on safeguards, proliferation risks and what the United States might receive in return.
The agreement signed in July 2026 opens the way for a two-year study of commercial enrichment, initially limited to uranium enriched to 5 percent. Any move toward 20 percent would require further review. Under the proposed arrangement, as reported, American companies would operate a facility using a “black box” model intended to prevent Saudi personnel from accessing sensitive centrifuge technology.
The agreement does not, however, require Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which provides for more intrusive verification, including inspections beyond declared sites.
The fundamental problem is not only whether these safeguards are sufficient. It is the assumption that the political circumstances under which nuclear capabilities are transferred will remain stable throughout their lifetime.
Infrastructure and investor confidence are exposed
The current war shows why that assumption is risky. Despite enormous investments in military modernization, Saudi Arabia has struggled to protect vital infrastructure from comparatively inexpensive missile and drone attacks. Its efforts to diversify export routes have also revealed their limits: the East–West pipeline became a target itself, while Houthi advances along the Red Sea threatened another critical maritime passage, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The consequences extend beyond immediate military damage. Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation depends on attracting foreign investment, developing tourism and new industries, and persuading international businesses that the kingdom is a safe, predictable place to operate. Repeated attacks on airports, energy facilities and transport networks undermine precisely that perception.
External military pressure, infrastructure damage, mounting war costs and declining economic confidence could become more destabilizing if compounded by a future succession crisis or fractures within the ruling elite or security establishment. Concentrated power can strengthen a regime while its center remains secure, but it can also increase vulnerability if that center comes under strain.
Nuclear technology can outlast the political system that receives it
These risks do not mean regime change is imminent. Nor should that be the test for nuclear policy. Washington does not need to predict the fall of the House of Saud. It needs to recognize that no one can confidently forecast the character of the Saudi political order over the lifetime of a nuclear program.
Uranium enrichment raises the stakes. It is not merely a component of civilian nuclear energy, but a strategic capability that could provide a foundation for a future weapons program. A “black box” arrangement may limit access to centrifuge designs, but it cannot fully prevent the accumulation of expertise, trained personnel and institutional knowledge. Once these capabilities exist, they cannot simply be recalled if relations with Washington deteriorate or Saudi Arabia’s political order changes.
Saudi leaders have been unusually explicit about the strategic significance of nuclear capabilities. In 2018, Mohammed bin Salman said that if Iran developed a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would follow suit. More recently, the kingdom’s defense agreement with nuclear-armed Pakistan added a nuclear dimension to Riyadh’s security relationships, even as subsequent Pakistani statements qualified the extent of those commitments.
Iran offers a relevant historical warning. The United States helped establish Iran’s civilian nuclear program when the Shah was one of Washington’s closest regional partners. Under Atoms for Peace, the US supplied Iran’s first research reactor and helped train Iranian nuclear scientists.
Then the political system changed.
The Islamic Republic’s current enrichment capabilities are not simply a direct inheritance from the American-supported program. But the broader lesson remains: nuclear institutions, expertise and ambitions can survive the political order under which they were created. Technology can outlast the strategic assumptions that justified its transfer.
Congress should assess long-term political resilience
Congress should examine more than nonproliferation safeguards and assess the agreement’s political durability. Who would control enrichment capabilities during a succession crisis? Could nuclear facilities be secured during a prolonged regional conflict? What would happen if relations with Washington deteriorated? And which political forces might ultimately inherit the infrastructure and expertise the United States helped establish?
This does not mean Saudi Arabia should be denied civilian nuclear energy simply because its political future is uncertain. It means that the more sensitive and enduring the technology being transferred, the less policymakers should rely on confidence in today’s leadership in place of durable safeguards and long-term strategic planning.
Mohammed bin Salman may successfully navigate the current crisis. But nuclear policy must account for the possibility that the kingdom’s political character will change substantially over time.
The decision under consideration in Washington could have consequences extending beyond Mohammed bin Salman and even beyond the current Saudi political order. Nuclear reactors can operate for 50 years or more, and the infrastructure, expertise and sensitive fuel-cycle capabilities associated with them can outlast governments and political systems.
The question, then, is not simply whether Washington trusts Saudi Arabia with sensitive nuclear technology today. It is whether the United States is prepared to trust the Saudi Arabia that might inherit it tomorrow.
Yoel Guzansky heads the Gulf Studies program at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies. He served on Israel’s National Security Council from 2005 to 2010 and co-authored Fraternal Enemies: Israel and the Gulf Monarchies (2020).
Henry Sokolski runs the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Arlington, Virginia. He served as the Pentagon’s deputy for nonproliferation policy from 1989 to 1993 and authored Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future (2019).
