A Perilous Omission in National Strategy
Once again, the essential strategic documents of a US administration – the National Defense Strategy and the National Security Strategy – have notably omitted any explicit mention of the spread of nuclear weapons or proliferation. This oversight, though disappointing, is no longer surprising, signaling a profound and potentially risky shift in geopolitical approach.
The „Case-by-Case” Strategy: A Nuclear Policy Without a Compass
While the United States previously maintained fairly tough nonproliferation policies, in recent years, the approach has become ad-hoc, „case-by-case.” This lack of consistency has created a confusing and contradictory landscape: while Iran’s nuclear program has been restricted, South Korea has been allowed to produce nuclear fuels that could be turned into bombs. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the policy remains vague and nuanced. Such a sporadic approach, without a unified framework, risks undermining global arms control efforts and sending ambiguous signals to international actors.
The Illusion of Security: Why We Underestimate the Danger of Proliferation
The unspoken assumption behind this „à la carte” approach is that a solid nonproliferation policy is no longer necessary. The future spread and possible use of nuclear weapons are considered a secondary threat, inferior to confronting the challenges posed by Beijing and Moscow. The argument is that if we can manage the nuclear threats from major powers, then issues posed by countries like Iran, or even allies, can surely be handled. Some even go further, arguing that more nuclear weapons in more countries’ hands – particularly US allies’ hands – would be a benefit. This 1950s-esque idea suggests America could reduce its defense spending on behalf of its allies if they were nuclear-armed, though history contradicts such a reduction. It also dangerously optimistically presumes that nuclear-armed allies would help America check Chinese and Russian nuclear threats. There’s also a cynical view that nonproliferation efforts are futile, requiring only „two people: one to count the countries and another person to wring their hands.” All these perspectives, however popular they become, support inaction and, in essence, are wrong.
Lessons from History: Nuclear Proliferation, A Source of Superpower Conflicts
Historically, the United States and like-minded nations have had a pretty solid record of preventing other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons by extending nuclear security guarantees. These guarantees were meant to keep the number of nuclear-armed states down, avoiding security chaos and the risk of drawing America into major wars. We have already had a bitter taste of the dangers proliferation can generate. In 1956, during the Suez Crisis, Russia threatened nuclear use in support of Egypt, and the United States had to call that „bluff.” Another near-nuclear crisis occurred in 1973 when President Richard Nixon went to DEFCON 3 to keep Soviet intervention against a nuclear-armed Israel at bay. Later, in 1991, the possibility of Saddam Hussein acquiring nuclear weapons drew military forces from over 30 countries into the region. In 1994, the Clinton administration considered attacking North Korea to short-circuit its nuclear weapons program. More recently, the United States came to Israel’s rescue after Israel began bombing Iran’s nuclear sites. Viewed through the lens of these events, the spread of nuclear weapons to small and medium-sized nations is not a minor threat but a major risk factor for superpower conflicts. Even if nuclear war did not break out in any of these cases, the possibility was real and well worth avoiding.
The Stakes of the Future: Are We Ready for a Fragmented Nuclear World?
Will America’s current and planned offensive nuclear forces be sufficient to deter such wars in the future? Will the spread of more nuclear weapons demand new and different kinds of missile defenses for the US and its allies? Will our intelligence, command, control, and communications systems be able to cope with a crowd of poorly-equipped nuclear-armed nations? The short answer is that we don’t know. We need time to get these answers, which is why creating an effective nuclear nonproliferation policy is absolutely necessary.
A Call to Action: Reclaiming a Robust Nonproliferation Policy
What should such a policy entail?
- Enforcing NPT Commitments: The United States and like-minded nations need to do more to get countries to live up to their promises not to acquire nuclear weapons. To this end, Washington should get as many nations as possible to agree in advance to penalties against any state that breaks its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) pledges.
- Modernizing Safeguard Systems: Washington should thoroughly overhaul and modernize the international nuclear safeguard system. The inspection systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and EURATOM are egregiously infrequent and based on outdated calculations of how much material needs to be diverted to make a bomb. The current system’s assumptions are, in fact, off by as much as a factor of four.
- Clearer Differentiation of Nuclear Activities: The United States and other exporters of nuclear reactors need to draw a clearer line between safe and dangerous nuclear activities that can bring countries, like Iran, within weeks of acquiring a bomb. Previous efforts to dissuade other countries from making nuclear fuel need to be revived.
- Holding China and Russia Accountable: The United States should hold China and Russia accountable for their „nuclear misbehavior.” Both countries complain about America’s „sharing” nuclear weapons with its allies in Europe and potentially Asia. Washington should call their bluff by demanding they scale back their own advanced nuclear deployments and production activities.
Implicit in all these proposals is taking a much tougher approach to the legally binding obligations spelled out in the NPT. It is easy to fall into the trap of ignoring the dysfunctions of multilateral efforts, or even believing that ignoring them is a policy in itself. But it is not.
