Since the joint US–Israeli attack on Feb. 28 ignited the latest war in the Middle East, the intensity of fighting has risen and fallen. But regardless of political claims about ceasefires, Iran’s stream of missiles and drones aimed at its neighbors has never really stopped.
That is bad news for the region. For analysts, however, the past ten weeks have produced something rare: a sustained, data‑rich war largely built around long‑range strikes.
In response to the initial attack, Iran launched thousands of missiles and one‑way attack drones at Israel, the Gulf States and US facilities across the region. Missile defense has largely succeeded in keeping casualties down, but Tehran appears to have found and exploited several weaknesses. At the same time, defending Israel seems to have consumed a larger share of available US interceptors than of Iran’s inventory of medium‑range ballistic missiles – a worrying signal for any renewed large‑scale confrontation.
From this sustained exchange, six key insights emerge about Iran’s missile arsenal and the lessons it holds for future conflicts.
Shield under pressure: missile defenses kept people alive
Israeli media report that almost 90 percent of the roughly 650 medium‑range ballistic missiles launched at Israel were intercepted by the country’s layered missile defenses.
The outer layer relies on Arrow‑3 interceptors, designed to hit targets outside the atmosphere. Missiles that penetrate that shield are engaged by Arrow‑2 and the David’s Sling system, which intercept in the terminal phase within the atmosphere. Iron Dome, famous for countering rockets and short‑range threats, had a limited role in this campaign, as the bulk of the attacks involved longer‑range systems and larger warheads. Israeli defenses were reinforced by US‑deployed THAAD batteries and US Navy ships in the Mediterranean armed with SM‑3 interceptors. The reported result: just 24 civilian fatalities.
Four ballistic missiles targeted Türkiye and were shot down, almost certainly by US Navy destroyers using SM‑3s, with Spanish and US Patriot batteries also deployed on Turkish soil.
In the Gulf, the threat profile looks different because of shorter distances: a torrent of short‑range missiles and one‑way attack drones. In the first month alone, there were at least 1,372 missile attacks and more than 4,400 drone strikes on Gulf States, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) absorbing the bulk of them.
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all operate Patriot systems; Saudi Arabia and the UAE also field THAAD for upper‑tier defense. The UAE additionally employed South Korean M‑SAM batteries. Israel reportedly contributed an Iron Dome battery and a laser system to strengthen UAE defenses. Multiple US Patriot batteries were sent to the Gulf, while US Navy vessels in the region used SM‑6 interceptors for terminal missile defense. Casualties remained relatively low, but oil infrastructure was hit and airlines and tourism across the region were seriously disrupted.
From terror weapons to precision tools: Iran’s surprising accuracy gains
For decades, ballistic missiles were seen as blunt instruments, too inaccurate for point targets and thus mainly used against cities for psychological effect. In recent years, Iran has quietly upgraded that model.
Many of its short‑range ballistic missiles now feature control fins and guidance systems, while a growing share of its medium‑range missiles employ maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs). These can adjust their path as they plunge back through the atmosphere, correcting for ballistic trajectory errors.
For defenders, MaRVs are a problem. Their end‑game maneuvers make it harder to predict impact points, which can delay or prevent engagement. They also force interceptors to maneuver aggressively, raising the risk of misses and increasing the number of interceptors required per incoming warhead.
Iran has already demonstrated what this looks like in practice. After the US killed Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020, Tehran fired around a dozen ballistic missiles at Al Asad Air Base in Iraq, with many impact points corresponding to specific buildings. In June 2025, after US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran targeted Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Patriots were on guard, but one of 14 ballistic missiles still managed to hit a communications node.
In the current conflict, Iran again inflicted damage on US sites, wounding seven US personnel. At least eleven American bases in the region, including Al Udeid, suffered damage, and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain was hit hard. Satellite imagery shows impacts on individual buildings, and many of the strikes on US facilities appear to have been deliberate, precision‑like attacks. One‑way attack drones contributed to the destruction alongside ballistic missiles.
Area denial by submunitions: wide‑scatter warheads over cities
Several missiles that slipped through Israel’s defensive layers hit civilian areas. At least sixteen carried unitary warheads, while around 50 used cluster warheads. Of the 24 people killed, only two were inside shelters. Cluster munitions were responsible for ten deaths, unitary warheads for fourteen.
Cluster warheads are typically intended to compensate for poor accuracy. Each individual submunition causes limited damage, but distributing many of them over a wider area raises the odds that at least one detonates near the intended target. Normally, the warhead dispenses its submunitions at an altitude of roughly 1–2 kilometers, matching the expected error in the missile’s impact point. Such weapons are particularly effective against relatively soft military targets – parked aircraft, unarmored vehicles, air‑defense radars.
Iran’s cluster‑armed missiles appear to have been set to break up at significantly higher altitudes, scattering sub.
