The Pentagon’s current National Defense Strategy (NDS) is outdated, the U.S. military is misconfigured, and the American industrial base is “grossly inadequate” to address the dual threats posed by Russia and China, according to a new, comprehensive review.
“Most of the U.S. public remains largely unaware of the dangers facing the United States or the financial and other costs necessary for adequate preparation” for potential global conflicts, states an early section of the final report from the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, released today. “A bipartisan ‘call to arms’ is urgently needed so that the United States can undertake major changes and significant investments now, rather than wait for the next Pearl Harbor or 9/11. The support and resolve of the American public are essential.”
Established by the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, the Commission was tasked with reviewing the NDS. Chaired by former Representative Jane Harman, a past ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, the bipartisan committee’s findings will likely be utilized—perhaps literally—as tools by supporters on Capitol Hill advocating for increased defense spending.
In a fact sheet accompanying the report, Harman noted, “The Department of Defense’s defense strategy was written prior to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and does not take into account the growing partnership between China and Russia. It is inadequate to meet current threats. We recommend a new approach that combines U.S. military capabilities with the ingenuity of the tech sector, our influence through diplomacy and investment, and the resilience of the American people.”
The 114-page report paints a concerning picture of America’s national security situation and presents a series of recommendations for policymakers in the White House, strategists in the Pentagon, and lawmakers. The proposals take a more aggressive, “more-of-everything” approach, with the most significant being a call for a “Multiple Theater Force Construct” to address the current “outdated” strategy.
“The Commission believes the United States requires a force-planning approach that is both global and prioritized. … An exclusive focus on a single adversary or region, as some have suggested, is fundamentally flawed given the global challenges posed by adversaries like China and Russia and the increasing cooperation among these adversaries across various regions,” the report states. “That said, the U.S. force-planning approach must prioritize effectively and efficiently allocate limited resources, address varying scope and scale threats, and ensure a mix of U.S. instruments of national power tailored to specific strategic objectives.”
The Commission’s recommended approach differs from the “two-war construct” developed post-Cold War for less capable rogue states—focused essentially on one conflict in Northeast Asia and another in the Middle East—and reflects the partnerships of U.S. adversaries, the U.S. system of alliances, and the necessity for global engagement.
The report calls for numerous changes to military services, including increased ship quantities and infrastructure for the Navy and more distributed satellites for the Space Force. Additionally, it advocates for the Air Force to advance its Next-Generation Air Dominance fighter initiative, despite its unclear future.
In the Indo-Pacific theater, the Commission emphasizes the need for increased undersea assets—“particularly Virginia-class submarines and large, uncrewed underwater vessels”—as well as more long-range bombers and long-range fire capabilities.
“The Commission is encouraged by recent agreements with regional allies and partners to enhance U.S. access,” the report states. “However, concerns remain regarding the continued underinvestment in new and upgraded facilities throughout the First and Second Island Chains, alongside the absence of new forces stationed west of the International Date Line.”
In Europe, the report critiques the NDS for labeling Russia, as many U.S. officials have, an “acute threat.” This characterization, it argues, “underestimates the threat from Russia by suggesting it is intense but short-lived.” Instead, the threat from Moscow is “chronic,” the report asserts—“ongoing and persistent.”
In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Commission posits that “the only viable course of action is to enhance the scale, capability, and freedom of action for material provided to Ukraine, enabling it to push back against Russia.”
Furthermore, it suggests that the U.S. should “strengthen its forward presence in Eastern Europe—centered around an armored corps equipped with headquarters, fire capabilities, air defenses, and various armored, sustainment, and aviation units—to deter Russian aggression against NATO’s eastern flank.”
“Ultimately,” the report concludes, “the goal is for Europe to assume a greater role in its defense, with assured and critical support from the United States. Given the likelihood of simultaneous conflicts, capability targets assigned to European allies through NATO’s Defense Planning Process should be deliberately chosen to reduce overreliance on the United States for essential capabilities.”
Industrial Mobilization for Defense
Regarding the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB), the report is clear: “[T]he current DIB suffers from a shortage of personnel, too few companies, declining and unstable financial backing, and insufficient production capacity to meet the needs of joint forces during both peacetime and wartime.”
The report specifically highlights weaknesses in shipbuilding for the Navy, stating that the service’s capacity to “construct, maintain, and repair the maritime forces it requires is fundamentally in question.”
The report criticizes various bureaucratic and legal barriers, including “Buy American” initiatives that “directly limit opportunities for allies and partners to engage in the defense market,” as well as International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) challenges that hinder allied cooperation.
Consequently, among a comprehensive list of recommendations, the Commission encourages lawmakers to work on reducing these barriers to allow allies to better contribute to the American defense industrial base and for the Pentagon to engage more proactively with international partners.
Additionally, it advises that “while continuing to boost production of current munitions, the Department of Defense must invest in new munitions and weapons to keep pace with the needs of warfighters and expand the DIB.” It further emphasizes the necessity of funding the recapitalization of armories and investing in advanced manufacturing alongside increased munitions stockpiling.
The Commission stresses that the Pentagon needs to expedite acquiring new technologies, criticizing its “byzantine research and development (R&D) and procurement procedures, reliance on outdated military hardware, and risk-averse culture,” though it cites the efforts of the Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Office of Strategic Capital, and Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hick’s Replicator initiatives as examples of uncommon agility.
In summary, the Commission posits that the Pentagon needs to enhance its approach to weapon procurement: “The United States must spend more effectively and efficiently to develop future forces rather than perpetuating the existing ones.”
Overall, Commission Vice Chair Ambassador Eric Edelman, a former Pentagon undersecretary for defense policy, stated that the U.S. “cannot confront the greatest threats since the height of the Cold War with the smallest military in a generation, historically low defense spending, and a diminished industrial base.”
“Deterring adversaries from instigating a catastrophic war demands investment and the ability to mobilize at wartime speed, not merely the pace of bureaucracy,” he emphasized.
