Military superiority was not matched by a digital strategy
The United States has demonstrated impressive military power in its conflict with Iran. Yet when Iranian authorities shut down the country’s internet and communications during nationwide anti-regime protests and Operation Epic Fury, Washington was not prepared to help Iranian civilians counter the government’s repressive tactics.
That weakness remains a major flaw in the broader U.S. campaign and should be one of the central lessons of the conflict. The U.S. government must take steps to prevent similar shortcomings in the future and develop plans that allow civilians to communicate freely in any country where authorities may impose a communications blackout.
The internet became both the engine of protest and the target of repression
The internet played a central role in mobilizing Iranian protesters by allowing civilians to organize and coordinate efforts against the regime. To prevent the demonstrations from spreading and intensify its campaign against dissent, the government shut down internet access nationwide.
Access was restored in late May after an 88-day blackout intended to prevent an uprising during the 2026 war. However, the regime continues to impose strict filters on civilian communications, maintains sophisticated systems for identifying people using virtual private networks, or VPNs, and unauthorized satellite services such as Starlink, and retains the ability to impose another nationwide blackout if unrest intensifies.
Circumvention tools remain expensive and vulnerable
Access to technologies capable of bypassing censorship could help civilians living under authoritarian governments in countries such as Iran, China, Myanmar and Cuba resist restrictions and surveillance more effectively. At present, however, many of the available tools are either too expensive or too easy for authorities to block.
VPNs, for instance, can be unaffordable for many civilians and remain vulnerable to government monitoring and interference — a widespread problem in Iran. In the past, the U.S. government supported private companies providing VPN services to people in countries with restricted internet access, including Iran, China and Russia, through the Open Technology Fund. Those programs have recently faced budget constraints.
In Iran, many users have turned to informal markets to purchase insecure VPN services or pay for “Internet Pro,” a heavily filtered internet tier reserved for selected groups.
Starlink offers an important option, but can be detected
Like VPNs, Starlink and other unauthorized satellite internet services are vulnerable to government surveillance and jamming technologies.
Starlink also requires large terminals that can be difficult to transport and conceal from authorities. Iranian police have said that between March and July 2026 they confiscated 997 Starlink devices and detained 163 people linked to the equipment.
Direct-to-cell technology could change the equation
Direct-to-cell, or D2C, technology could eventually provide civilians with another means of communication during a complete shutdown of terrestrial internet and cellular networks.
The system allows mobile phones to connect directly to satellites without relying on traditional satellite dishes or large ground terminals. Several technology companies are working to improve and expand D2C capabilities, including communications and web browsing, while increasing compatibility with different smartphone models.
However, the availability, speed and reliability of these services vary among providers, and the technology remains under development. Deploying it consistently across different countries is complicated by technical and regulatory obstacles, as well as by government bans on unauthorized communications systems.
Washington needs a long-term strategy
As Tehran and other authoritarian governments retain the power to cut off civilian internet access and communications, the United States should work with the private sector to develop a broad strategy supporting civilians in repressive countries.
The goal should be twofold: helping people bypass everyday restrictions and ensuring access to functioning communications during future nationwide shutdowns.
VPNs can bypass certain forms of online censorship, but they cannot function when terrestrial infrastructure is completely disabled. For that reason, the U.S. government should redirect additional resources toward developing long-term solutions to the communications crisis.
Smaller terminals and support for affected populations
During a total communications blackout, satellite internet services may remain among the few available options. The United States could support the delivery of terminals to civilians in affected areas through humanitarian organizations capable of operating in conflict zones while complying with safety and legal requirements.
At the same time, Washington should work with SpaceX to develop smaller Starlink terminals that are easier to transport and assemble as part of its Starshield program. Reducing the size of the equipment could lower the risk of attracting the attention of authorities in countries where possession of the technology is prohibited.
Congress should accelerate D2C development
Congress should direct the relevant agencies to work with companies developing direct-to-cell systems in order to accelerate the technology’s progress and expand its capabilities.
Priorities should include reliable cellular communications, web browsing and live-streaming functions. Once testing is complete and the products are confirmed to be secure, the State Department could work with humanitarian organizations to distribute D2C-compatible phones to civilians in need.
At the same time, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control should quickly issue the licenses required to transport and distribute these products. Sanctions imposed on authoritarian governments for repressive and destabilizing actions can restrict transactions by U.S. organizations in those countries, making a clear legal framework essential.
Communications freedom is a national security issue
As authoritarian governments increasingly turn the internet and civilian communications into instruments of control and repression, the United States needs a coherent set of technologies and policies to defend the free flow of information.
Such a system could improve the lives of people in restrictive countries by giving them safer ways to communicate, access to uncensored information and stronger tools to resist regimes seeking to isolate and silence them.
