As Washington once again attempts diplomacy with Tehran amidst an expanded US naval and air posture, the United States faces a familiar and dangerous risk: defining success too narrowly. Expert analysis highlights that past efforts to manage the Iran challenge have understandably focused primarily on Iran’s nuclear program, treating regional proxies as secondary concerns. Such a strategy, security voices warn, risks repeating earlier failures, especially if it leaves the operational capacity of Iranian-backed groups intact.
Tehran’s Yemeni Proxy: The Houthis’ Global Reach
Within Iran’s vast proxy network, the Houthis in Yemen are more than just the „last group standing”; they are unique in their proven ability to impose significant costs far beyond their borders and directly target core US national security interests. After October 7, 2023, the group opened a new front from Yemen, launching nearly 300 missiles and drones at Israeli territory and roughly 700 projectiles at commercial and military vessels. This escalation transformed a regional conflict into a global economic problem, leading to higher prices for US consumers, forcing major carriers to reroute traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, driving insurance premiums higher, and tying down US and allied naval forces. The financial and operational costs imposed on global shipping companies are immense.
The War Factory: How Iran Fuels Conflict and Regenerates Houthi Forces
Thanks to years of Iranian support, the Houthis now benefit from a robust production system that blends local assembly with imported components. They assemble ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and uncrewed aerial vehicles from hardened facilities embedded in mountainous terrain. Their ability to fabricate airframes, integrate warheads, and prepare launch infrastructure locally allows them to regenerate forces quickly after strikes. However, this system still depends on Iranian supply chains for engines, propulsion systems, guidance units, avionics, and other specialized electronics. This reliance provides the Houthis with a range, accuracy, and operational tempo far beyond what Yemen’s industrial base could otherwise support.
A Flawed Strategy: Washington’s Limited Response Proves Ineffective
U.S. policy has nonetheless prioritized managing escalation over eliminating the threat. Operation Prosperity Guardian focused on defending shipping and intercepting incoming missiles and drones, but did not dismantle Houthi capacity to conduct these attacks. From March to May 2024, Operation Rough Rider went further, expanding strikes against Houthi launch sites, storage areas, and military infrastructure. While it contributed to a ceasefire that halted attacks on US naval vessels, it did not severely degrade the group’s capabilities, did not stop Houthi attacks against Israel, and has not deterred them from threatening to resume attacks on Israel and international shipping.
The Crucial Crossroads: Integrating the Houthi Threat into Iran Strategy
Against Iran and the Houthis, deterrence has failed, negotiations have produced no restraint, and defensive measures and limited strikes have not reduced their ability or willingness to attack. The United States now has a critical opportunity to undermine a regime that has terrorized the Middle East and its own people for 40 years. But only if Washington treats the Houthi threat as an integral part of the Iran problem, rather than a parallel challenge.
Diplomacy or Force: A Comprehensive Approach is Imperative
However the administration chooses to address the Iran problem—through diplomacy or military force—it must include the Houthis in that approach. As long as Iran can continue supplying and sustaining Houthi missile and drone capabilities, it retains a durable means of imposing costs beyond its borders. The United States must use the full range of tools at its disposal to sever Iran’s supply chains to the Houthis and ensure Iran cannot rely on the Houthis as a standing instrument of pressure.
If the current negotiations produce an agreement, it should not focus only on Iran’s nuclear program while leaving its proxy network untouched. Any deal needs clear limits on Iran’s ability to arm, fund, and sustain the Houthis, along with mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance. Otherwise, Tehran would retain a ready tool to threaten global shipping and regional partners even as Washington claims diplomatic success.
If talks collapse and the administration follows through on the former president’s threat to attack Iran, the United States should pair strikes on Iranian targets with offensive pressure on Houthi launch sites and supply networks, while also strengthening regional air and missile defenses to protect shipping and partner countries. With the Houthis threatening escalation with a video showing a burning ship captioned “soon,” and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning US strikes “will be a regional war,” the need to address Iran’s proxy front as part of the same campaign is clear. An outcome that leaves supply to the Houthis intact—whether through omission, ambiguity, or unenforced commitments—would leave Iran’s proxy leverage untouched. It is unacceptable to leave intact such a dangerous network that can continue undermining regional stability and the credibility of America’s commitment to security.
