A little-known joint center for integrating cyber operations proved instrumental during the operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, a top Navy cyber official recently stated. This center underscores a new era in the conduct of modern conflicts, where physical borders blur in the face of digital capabilities.
A Strategic Revelation: The Unique Role of the JIFC
The Joint Integrated Fire Center (JIFC) functions as a combined air operations center, tasked with coordinating all aircraft in an area of operations. Vice Admiral Hedi Berg, commander of the 10th Fleet/Fleet Cyber Command, explained at the recent annual WEST 2026 conference in San Diego that this organization encompasses all headquarters elements and teams for cyber operations, augmented by space counterparts, the intelligence community, and interagency entities. Its mission is to build a profound understanding of „cyber fires” and to collaborate with kinetic and maneuver forces to integrate them at the timing and tempo decided by the commander.
Validation on the Digital Battlefield: Operation „Absolute Resolve”
The way the JIFC was used during Operation „Absolute Resolve” validated this construct, thanks to „exceptionally precise layered fires that also supported maneuver,” Vice Admiral Berg emphasized in her public comments. The experience demonstrated a vast, complex, and precise integration, highlighting the „absolute criticality of the precise delivery of cyber and space fires, integrated with signals intelligence (SIGINT).” The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff himself affirmed that „we will never execute operations as we had previously; we will always see cyber, space, and SIGINT at the forefront of how we execute operations.” Prestigious international publications reported that, during this operation, cyber entities took actions to cut power in Venezuela, interfered with air defense radars, and disrupted handheld radios, signaling a much deeper integration into classic operations.
The Architecture of Cyber Forces: A Brief Overview
There are various types of cyber organizations and forces conducting operations globally. These include:
- Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-Cyber): These entities, led by the heads of service cyber components, are assigned to specific combatant commands to provide planning, targeting, intelligence, synchronization, and command and control of cyber capabilities. They command Combat Mission Teams that conduct offensive cyber operations and Combat Support Teams that provide intelligence and planning.
- Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF): A subordinate command, charged with defending the nation from significant cyber threats. It consists of 39 joint teams, organized into task forces aligned against specific nation-state threat actors.
- DOD Cyber Defense Command (DCDC): Responsible for conducting defensive cyber operations across the globe.
From Conception to Execution: The Birth of the JIFC
The JIFC concept originated approximately three years ago, stemming from an unnamed top-tier exercise, Vice Admiral Berg explained in an interview on the sidelines of the conference. A spokesperson later clarified that the JIFC used for the Venezuela operation was modeled after one managed by Fleet Cyber for Indo-Pacific Command. Under the JFHQ-Cyber, Fleet Cyber coordinates cyber operations for INDOPACOM, SOUTHCOM, and U.S. Forces Korea.
It is important to note that the JIFC is not a standing body, like the Cyber Operations-Integrated Planning Elements, which are essentially forward extensions of the JFHQ-C within the combatant command staff to help plan cyber effects. Rather, it is stood up for an exercise, a specific operation, or for planning purposes if an operation is likely to take place.
A Single Point of Coordination: Simplifying Complexity
Berg highlighted that the JIFC provides a single point of contact for customers to express requirements and access capabilities from all three aforementioned groups. This is crucial, as multiple forces might be operating in a particular area. For instance, Vice Admiral Berg is responsible for cyber operations in SOUTHCOM with Combat Mission Teams. There could also be CNMF teams operating against certain actors there, as well as cyber support for SOCOM activities from JFHQ-C Marines or defensive activity from DCDC.
All these cyber forces „had to come through the JIFC, which allowed us to truly understand, and it was also helpful for the customer. They had one place to go for requirements. They had one place to go to ask ‘what do you have in your toolkit?’ and we were able to do that,” she stated. „That allowed us, again, through execution, to better understand the layering and how we might want to continue to adjust how we layer those fires, and then how we carry out that execution.” Berg called this capability „game-changing,” having evolved significantly since its inception, stating that „there’s no ‘stray voltage’ out there that you have to clean up. We have a construct that enables all this integration.”
Challenges and Evolution: The Road to Perfection
However, there is still much work to be done to improve integration and coordination. For example, while the JIFC has proven effective, it remains a complex system and depends on the quality of its personnel for integration. Furthermore, it is not a standing body that can direct, but rather an organization for integration and synchronization. Therefore, continuous relationship development over time is necessary.
Efforts are also aimed at integrating more defensive operations. „I don’t think we quite have it right yet to represent the full ecosystem; while it’s good at offensive fires, I really need to fully integrate the entire defensive ecosystem, including securing, operating, and defending,” she said. „When an adversary is targeting us, how do I not just build out the resilience and whatever protective measures we have to put into place for a fleet to continue to operate, but also how do I design targeting packages to be able to target that particular adversary and their infrastructure to take them out and stop their attacks? Instead of just building our wall higher to defend against arrows, how are we also rapidly going after the archers and the arrow factories?”
Strategic Education: The Power of Cyber Nuance
Vice Admiral Berg stated that it is imperative, in 2026, to accelerate the integration of space and cyber into other domains. The JIFC was the result of an exercise where two key aspects were missing: integration with supported commands and an understanding of what cyber can do for those commands.
„Educating the customer base is another aspect that will allow us, I believe, to better employ capabilities,” she explained. „Often, they will understand, ‘Hey, I heard there’s a capability that does X’ instead of ‘I need Y done,’ and that allows us to think through, ‘Okay, if you want Y done, here’s a way we could accomplish it’.”
Berg noted that each combatant command is integrating these effects at a different pace, and understanding their speed, as well as how cyber can provide support, is paramount. She exemplified how cyber tools can be employed in a more nuanced way than traditional capabilities. „Whether it is a ‘warning shot’ that you can execute in a less visible way, or it is the opportunity to execute a cyber fire that can then act as a deterrent because it doesn’t demand the same level of response as a kinetic fire.” Berg pointed out that, at the outset of a recent major conflict, cyber actions affected tens of thousands of users, but did not trigger a collective defense response, which would likely have been the result of a kinetic fire. „This is a much more nuanced tool for escalation dynamics, which we haven’t quite managed to master yet,” she concluded.
