The ongoing war in Ukraine serves as a contemporary case study of communication in battle, illustrating the struggle between military forces of unequal strength. Despite its technological advancements, Ukraine remains outmatched by Russia’s well-established defense industry and its significant edge in electronic warfare (EW).
Consequently, Ukraine may need to seek more cost-effective communication solutions rather than trying to compete with Russia on the electronic warfare front.
Since the advent of two-way radios, militaries have increasingly relied on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) instead of physical cables for communication. Almost immediately, adversaries began developing countermeasures to disrupt this new domain, such as introducing false signals on the same frequency or even targeting radio operators. This initiated a persistent cycle of competition in electronic warfare that continues to evolve. Modern military operations depend heavily on access to the EMS for communications, navigation, and overall command and control (C2). As a result, near-peer competitors have invested in strategies to deny their adversaries access to the EMS. Competing with major military powers in this rapidly advancing technological landscape demands substantial investment, intelligence on adversary capabilities, and continuous innovation.
However, this approach may not be viable or suitable for a nation like Ukraine, which operates on a comparatively leaner defense budget than its larger opponent.
For a smaller military power grappling with a regional aggressor, it may be more advantageous to utilize past communication techniques to evade EW attacks aimed at crippling EMS systems. Employing legacy communication methods can prove to be more economical than developing a secure wireless architecture in a high-risk environment. Moreover, by decreasing reliance on the EMS for secure communications, a military can enact „spectrum denial” at the frontlines, jamming radio frequencies without the risk of disrupting its own communications.
At the onset of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian forces employed EW tactics extensively to target Ukrainian air defenses and radio communications. However, following Russia’s previous aggression in 2014, Ukraine anticipated these tactics. As a result, Ukraine was less dependent on the EMS for tactical communications and adapted swiftly to traditional methods, such as deploying runners and dispatch drivers.
Conversely, Russia experienced significant operational challenges due to its jamming efforts, which hindered its command capabilities on the battlefield. Although detrimental to both parties, EMS denial disproportionately affected the attacking force, which relied heavily on technological solutions. Realizing this after the first week of conflict, Russia decided to ease the suppression of Ukrainian radar and communications. While having EW superiority would be beneficial, Ukraine’s reduced dependence on the EMS, along with other strategic factors, lessened Russia’s considerable EW advantage during the invasion’s initial phases.
A hardwired tactical network represents another example of a legacy technique that could be effectively employed in a contested electromagnetic environment. Wired networks are immune to jamming by adversaries and require physical access to intercept communications. Spiral-bound cables can be deployed rapidly and have proven effective in previous conflicts for communication over extensive distances. Modern vehicles, such as cable trucks, could expedite the creation of expansive wired networks.
This method is particularly advantageous for static defensive positions that can be established before or at the start of hostilities. While physical wire lines can be severed, creating parallel paths can enhance redundancy. In the worst-case scenario, as seen in Ukraine, runners and drivers can be utilized for the final tactical communication mile.
One potential drawback of this approach is that wired networks may expose command and control (C2) hubs to enemy reconnaissance operations. To mitigate this risk, decoy lines and hubs can be constructed to disguise the locations of actual targets. While adversaries might search for physical wires, modern signals intelligence and direction-finding methods can quickly detect and pinpoint electromagnetic emissions from C2 hubs that depend on the EMS.
Other nations might consider concealing tactical communications underground to boost resilience. While such construction could be time-consuming and costly, many locations possess pre-existing subterranean infrastructure that could be utilized.
For instance, Taipei City, the capital of Taiwan, features over 100 kilometers of earthquake-resistant metro tunnels. This partially underground system contains over 100 stations organized in a hub-and-spoke model with redundant central lines. Such metro systems could be leveraged to establish a robust and resilient C2 framework, highly protected against jamming, signal interception, and physical attacks.
By balancing legacy techniques, modern technology, and existing infrastructure, nations can adopt a more cost-effective approach to resilient communication for military operations within a heavily contested EMS. In terms of battlefield communication resilience, Ukraine exemplifies that sometimes traditional systems and methods offer militaries simpler and less expensive alternatives to maintain critical communication channels.
Nicholas Johnson is a senior technical analyst at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit and nonpartisan research institution. With a background in the United States Navy and experience as a combat systems test engineer, his current research focuses on missile defense, electromagnetic warfare, naval warfare, and wargaming.