The sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024 has shifted attention predominantly towards Russia and its approach to Syria, particularly in light of its ongoing conflict in Ukraine. However, this focus often overlooks the significant role played by Iran and its proxies in supporting Assad’s regime. While Russia has been at war for nearly three years, it was only when Hezbollah became preoccupied with its battles against Israel that Assad’s regime finally began to fall apart due to a lack of support from Tehran.
Strengthening Iran-Russia Relations:
Under the proposed “comprehensive strategic partnership” between Moscow and Tehran, it’s expected that the Iran-Russia relationship will not only strengthen on a conventional level but also in terms of Russia’s backing of Iran’s proxy forces. A renegotiated defense treaty could lead to increased involvement of groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias in the Iran-Russia dynamic.
Increased Military Support and Opportunities:
With this renewed defense agreement, Iran is likely to allocate larger budgets to its armed proxies and heighten weapons shipments, offering Russia access to black-market arms and avenues to avoid sanctions. Reports indicate that by March and April 2022, Iranian-backed Hashd al-Sha’bi militants were already shipping military equipment to Russia for use in Ukraine.
Mutual Arms Flow and Tactical Exchanges:
The reverse flow of military equipment is also notable. Following Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, there were reports that Assad agreed to provide Hezbollah with advanced Russian missile systems through the Wagner Group. Although not all deliveries have been confirmed, evidences of sophisticated Russian weaponry in Hezbollah’s possession have prompted concerns regarding arms proliferation between these nations.
Training and Technical Assistance:
Military and technical collaborations are ongoing, with reports of Iranian forces training Russian troops on various UAVs and defense systems. This cooperation not only bolsters the capabilities of both nations but facilitates the transfer of crucial military expertise and operational techniques among proxies.
Potential for Manufacturing and Local Production:
The new defense treaty could expedite the joint manufacturing of weapons systems, allowing Iran to produce a greater number of Russian arms domestically. For instance, a drone factory capable of producing Iranian-spec UAVs is already operational in Russia, highlighting the benefits of shared military technologies.
Economic Implications and Sanction Evasion:
As Iran and Russia deepen their trade relations amidst heavy sanctions, they are likely to create more robust shadow economies. This cooperation in various spheres, particularly in arms trading and logistical support, could streamline operations and facilitate the movement of illicit goods via established networks, posing challenges to international monitoring.
Conclusion:
The evolving relationship between Russia and Iran has transitioned from a mere convenience to a structured alliance, positioning both countries as cooperative partners in military and economic endeavors. With this formalized agreement, Iran’s proxies are expected to receive advanced weaponry, resulting in heightened aggressive tactics against adversaries, including direct threats to Israel. This growing collaboration offers significant advantages for both Russia and Iran, reinforcing their shared goal of challenging Western influence in the region and sustaining their strategic interests.