A recent analysis of the Epic Fury operation failures against Iran argues that the United States won the „wrong” air war. The central argument, promoting the concept of the „air littoral,” is criticized as a theoretical invention that risks creating confusion among joint forces rather than offering real solutions.
An artificial division of an indivisible domain
The „air littoral” concept is defined by its proponents as the airspace between ground forces and high-end fighters. In reality, this segmentation is an artificial barrier that ignores military history. Fighters and bombers have always operated at low altitudes whenever the mission required it. Modern threats—drones, cruise missiles, and loitering munitions—are indeed major challenges, but U.S. military doctrine already addresses them through integrated air defense systems and electronic warfare. Inventing a new name for low-altitude airspace does not create a new strategy; it merely fragments the battlefield image unnecessarily.
The risk of compartmentalization in the face of coordinated attacks
Aerial threats do not respect conceptual boundaries. In a coordinated attack, a drone flying at 300 feet, a cruise missile at 100 feet, and a ballistic missile descending from space are all part of the same enemy effort. Slicing the problem by altitude can obscure the vital relationships between these elements rather than illuminating them. Effective defense requires a common operational picture and integrated offensive action against launchers and command nodes, not a separation of responsibilities based on altitude „floors.”
Real lessons from the Strait of Hormuz and operation Epic Fury
The Strait of Hormuz demonstrates why the „air littoral” label is more confusing than useful. Freedom of navigation is a joint mission: naval forces provide sea control, air forces neutralize launch networks, and the army protects critical infrastructure. Attributing the failures in this region exclusively to airpower, through the lens of this new concept, represents an analytical error. Operation Epic Fury did not show that America fought the „wrong” air war; instead, it highlighted the need for all domains—air, land, sea, cyber, and space—to function as a single, synchronized campaign.
