The job demands more than political connections and public profile
Few senior federal positions carry the prestige of the U.S. Secretary of the Navy. That prominence helps explain why the role sometimes goes to influential politicians or political donors, even though success outside the Pentagon does not necessarily translate into effective leadership inside it. The recent departure of John Phelan has revived a fundamental question: what qualities does a successful Navy secretary need?
Historical examples point to a demanding combination of strategic understanding, institutional knowledge, bureaucratic skill and political credibility.
Strategic vision grounded in history and economics
The Navy secretary must be able to explain to Congress and the public why naval power matters to the United States—and why it deserves funding. That requires an understanding of how maritime routes support the country’s security and prosperity, as well as what it takes for a nation to become and remain a maritime power.
A secretary need not quote naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan from memory. But a strong grounding in history, geopolitics and economics is essential, as is an appreciation of the consistent political leadership required to sustain a maritime strategy.
Knowledge of the institution takes time to build
Experience in the Navy or Marine Corps, whether in uniform or in a civilian role, offers a significant advantage. The secretary needs to understand the communities within both services and how each contributes to the nation’s interests.
Gideon Welles, for example, had held logistical responsibilities in the Navy before leading the department during the Civil War. That background helped prepare him to expand the fleet for the blockade of the Confederacy. By contrast, a newcomer may spend so much of a term learning how the institution works that there is little time left to make consequential changes.
Reform requires bureaucratic skill and resolve
Efforts to redirect the Navy can encounter resistance from both uniformed leaders and the civilian workforce. Some of the service’s most consequential innovations have taken hold only because civilian leaders challenged established practices.
Graham Claytor, secretary of the Navy under President Jimmy Carter, argued against reducing the Navy to a purely defensive force. He instead backed a strategy that could threaten the Soviet Union’s vulnerable flanks. Claytor also outmaneuvered Adm. Hyman Rickover when the influential officer tried to advance his own nuclear strategy through congressional lobbying.
Civilian authority must be asserted when necessary. Paul Nitze, who led the Navy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, demonstrated that principle when he fired an admiral who tried to undermine his authority with Navy personnel.
Private-sector experience can help rebuild the defense industry
Experience in business—particularly in finance, production and contract management—can help a secretary identify practices that could strengthen the defense industrial base.
During World War II, James Forrestal recognized that the Navy’s procurement system could not meet the demands of modern warfare. Despite opposition from Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King, Forrestal established an office to oversee major contracts and ensure they delivered the forces the Navy needed without conflicting with the requirements of other military services.
Congress must be treated as a partner
Building relationships and making the case on Capitol Hill are essential parts of the job. The secretary must show lawmakers that they understand the Navy’s problems, have a credible plan to address them and are committed to carrying that plan through.
Josephus Daniels, who served as Navy secretary under President Woodrow Wilson, managed to outmaneuver admirals who sought to use their congressional relationships to expand their own influence. Rather than relying solely on open confrontation, Daniels made sure his views carried decisive weight with the legislators who mattered.
White House backing gives the secretary room to act
The secretary’s authority also depends on the confidence of the president and the defense secretary. Without their support, initiatives can stall amid internal opposition and bureaucratic disputes.
John Lehman, who led the Navy under President Ronald Reagan, said his effectiveness did not depend on close personal ties to Reagan or Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. What mattered was that his policies supported the administration’s broader strategy—and that the defense secretary delegated meaningful authority to the service secretaries instead of trying to micromanage every decision.
Hung Cao has military experience, but the job will demand more
The Trump administration’s nomination of Hung Cao has brought these qualifications back into focus. Cao has substantial military experience and strong relationships with influential administration figures. He is known for taking on difficult challenges, learning quickly and showing loyalty to colleagues.
Those qualities could give him a strong starting point. His prospects, however, will also depend on his willingness to develop the strategic, administrative and political skills required to lead the department. His nomination and tenure will show whether he can bring all those strengths together.
The Navy is facing one of its most challenging periods since the end of the Cold War. Steering it back on course will require a leader able to combine talent and experience with political backing—and to earn the confidence of both Pentagon insiders and decision-makers beyond the department.
