PLAN’s Modernization and Expanding Reach Raise Concerns in the Indo-Pacific
China’s naval modernization and operational experimentation have progressed rapidly since commissioning its first aircraft carrier in 2012. Recent actions demonstrate the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) growing ability to conduct both high-intensity operations near its shores and lower-intensity missions globally.
First Distant Multi-Carrier Operations
In a significant development, the PLAN recently conducted its first distant multi-aircraft carrier operations. Japan’s Self Defense Forces observed the aircraft carrier Liaoning operating southwest of Minamitori Island, marking the first time a Chinese carrier has ventured beyond the second island chain.
The Liaoning and Shandong were deployed for „far-sea combat-oriented training” in the high seas, entering the Western Pacific at separate locations before engaging in joint operations.
Blue-Water Navy Strategy
These moves align with China’s broader „blue-water navy” strategy, extending naval aviation operations beyond the safety of land bases and indicating growing proficiency in sustaining multi-carrier flight operations with limited logistical support.
Implications of Carrier Operations
While not the first time PRC forces have crossed beyond the second island chain, it is the first time aircraft carriers have operated this far. Aircraft carriers are considered the most valuable sea-based assets and the pinnacle of a nation’s naval diplomacy. They function as floating air bases capable of coordinating vessel-aircraft operations, conducting Air Interdiction, Anti-Surface Warfare, and offensive and defensive Counter-Air operations.
System-to-System Competition
Recent PLA doctrinal writing emphasizes system-to-system competition, where victory depends on outperforming adversaries’ integrated systems. In this informatized form of warfare, the operational success of command posts is crucial.
The Liaoning, hailed by Chinese state media as the „benchmark force,” has assumed central roles as at-sea command centers and currently hosts the PLAN’s „Aircraft Carrier 1st Task group Command Post.” Its command center was upgraded in 2018 with extensive communications features, enabling communication to the Liaoning’s 40 aircraft, including Shenyang J-15 fighter jets, Changhe Z-18F anti-submarine helicopters, Changhe Z-18J airborne early warning helicopters, and Harbin Z-9C rescue helicopters. The Shandong can carry up to 50 J-15 fighters.
Combat Drills
During this deployment, both vessels carried out a series of drills, including reconnaissance, air defense, and counterstrikes, under „combat conditions.” Japan’s Defense Ministry confirmed close to 520 take-offs and landings across both vessels.
Legal Considerations
While these activities underscore China’s growing naval reach, they remain within the bounds of international law. Large swathes of the Pacific Ocean are considered international waters where no single nation has sovereignty, and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes the right to navigate international waters without interference.
Comparison to US Carriers
China’s carriers remain behind the US in size and capability. According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies assessment, the Liaoning lags behind US carriers due to its less efficient power plant and underpowered aircraft-launching system. Its size is smaller than the US Nimitz-class carrier USS Ronald Reagan stationed in Japan and falls short of the Reagan’s fixed-wing capacity.
Implications for Taiwan
The Liaoning and Shandong’s extending reach demonstrates the PLAN’s rapid modernization and marks a step in Beijing’s effort to reshape the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. If China were able to stall or disrupt US naval forces beyond the second island chain, it could seriously complicate combat operations necessary to thwart a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan.
Reinforcing Taiwan would become significantly more difficult and costly, as carrier strike groups and logistics convoys would have to traverse contested waters under threat from Chinese anti-access and area denial systems.
US Response and Deterrence
As the threat landscape evolves, Washington must sustain a robust naval presence around the second island chain to counter China’s growing naval presence. Enhancing the existing ship-rider agreements with Pacific Island nations could support rotational deployments, establish regional maritime training centers, and integrate with US naval deployments.
Mere presence alone is no longer enough. China’s carrier operations beyond the second island chain mark a turning point in Indo-Pacific security. To protect security interests, the US must solidify an enduring posture, one built on operational readiness.
