Biological threats can disrupt operations before the military has time to respond
The United States still treats biodefense too much as a safety net for the public health system and not enough as a core element of military force protection. That approach must change.
Military experience shows that readiness is not built when a threat emerges. It is built beforehand. Personnel sent into high-risk environments need training, equipment, intelligence, planning and support before they are exposed to danger. The same principle must apply to biological threats.
A biological event does not have to result from an attack to create major military consequences. A natural outbreak, an accidental release of pathogens or a deliberate incident could affect troop deployments, base operations, shipboard readiness, homeland defense and the ability to operate in contested environments.
When a new virus emerges, military personnel may be exposed before commanders have enough tools to protect their units and preserve operational capacity.
Biological threats move faster than institutions
The challenge has several dimensions, ranging from identifying the pathogens most likely to threaten military forces to funding the research and development of effective medical countermeasures.
The most serious vulnerability, however, is speed. Biological threats can evolve faster than public policy, procurement procedures, budget cycles, interagency coordination and strategic stockpile decisions.
By the time a new viral crisis becomes visible, defense organizations may already be behind. Surveillance systems may need to be adjusted, diagnostic methods adapted, and vaccines or treatments may still be undergoing evaluation or awaiting regulatory approval.
Manufacturing capacity may also be limited. Together, these factors can sharply reduce the number of options available to commanders and delay the operational response.
Broad-spectrum antivirals should be evaluated before a crisis
For that reason, broad-spectrum prophylactic antiviral countermeasures should be included from the outset in force protection planning.
Promising prophylactic technologies must be evaluated long before an unknown virus emerges. Scientific development requires credible evidence, rigorous procedures, regulatory oversight and an honest assessment of benefits and limitations.
Many such programs require government support because access to lethal virus samples, high-containment laboratories and emergency-use planning is tightly controlled.
Developing protection against future viral threats is difficult without government approval, partnership and funding. Government and industry must act proactively, using regulatory and approval pathways well before an outbreak creates operational urgency.
Bundibugyo Ebola highlights current gaps
The Ebola virus provides a clear example. The recent outbreak associated with the Bundibugyo strain underscores the limits of existing response capabilities.
There is currently no licensed vaccine or approved, effective specific therapy for Bundibugyo virus disease. Vaccine development, evaluation and deployment take time. A broad-spectrum prophylactic antiviral could provide a protective buffer while those processes are underway.
Government-funded preclinical research conducted in Biosafety Level 4 laboratories operated by the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases examined Ampligen, also known as rintatolimod, as a potential prophylactic or early-onset treatment for Ebola infection.
According to results published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, a rintatolimod-treated cohort achieved 100% survival in a lethal mouse model, while all animals in the control group died.
The findings support additional research into the drug’s mechanism of action and its potential use against multiple Ebola variants, including Bundibugyo. However, the results remain preclinical and do not establish clinical efficacy in humans or regulatory approval for that use.
The COVID-19 pandemic offered another warning
The COVID-19 pandemic provided another example of the cost of delay.
Between the 2003 SARS outbreak and the emergence of COVID-19, government-funded researchers at Utah State University’s Institute for Antiviral Research studied potential treatments for coronavirus infections.
Those preclinical studies supported further evaluation of Ampligen as an early-onset antiviral against SARS-related coronaviruses. However, the research did not advance into a government-approved and readily deployable countermeasure before the next crisis arrived.
SARS-CoV-2 is genetically very closely related to SARS-CoV. The lesson is clear: potential countermeasures must be evaluated before a related threat becomes a global emergency.
The COVID-19 outbreak aboard the USS Theodore Roosevelt infected approximately 1,200 sailors and disrupted operations aboard one of the US Navy’s most important assets. A faster continuation of earlier research might, at least in theory, have provided the ship’s commander with an additional prophylactic option.
Turning research into an operational capability
Promising scientific findings should not remain disconnected from military planning until an outbreak forces authorities to act.
Defense planners should integrate prophylactic antivirals directly into force protection programs alongside:
- detection and diagnostic systems;
- personal protective equipment;
- decontamination procedures;
- deployment and operational continuity plans;
- medical countermeasure stockpiles.
Broad-spectrum antiviral platforms and early-onset treatments should be evaluated, approved where appropriate, manufactured and stockpiled against priority biological threats capable of affecting deployed forces.
For service members, readiness means protection before exposure. For commanders, it means having options before a mission is compromised. For policymakers, it means building systems that can move before the threat dictates the pace.
Biodefense is force protection
If biodefense is truly a defense mission, medical countermeasures must be treated as elements of military readiness—not merely as public health tools to be mobilized after a crisis has already begun.
The next biological threat will not wait for a procurement cycle, a budget cycle or a perfect political consensus. Preparation must begin now, so that military forces are not forced to respond with too few options when the next crisis emerges.
