If you were to ask the average American how much of the defense budget is dedicated to countering missile attacks on the homeland, they might guess around 5% or 10%. In reality, the figure is shockingly below 1%.
Out of this year’s proposed $850 billion defense budget, only about $6 billion—if generously defined—has been allocated for defending against missile threats from nations like China, Russia, or North Korea. Additionally, the Biden Administration has suggested cutting $500 million from the Missile Defense Agency’s overall budget.
Why pursue reductions in missile defense spending, especially when U.S.-developed missile defense systems have demonstrated impressive success in protecting Ukraine’s and Israel’s skies? President Biden has historically expressed skepticism about the feasibility of U.S. homeland ballistic missile defense, seemingly unconvinced by the recent successes of three test trials involving realistic threat scenarios. Some of his supporters argue—incorrectly—that regional and point defense systems useful for defending the U.S. homeland against low-flying cruise missiles remain “untested.”
On the other hand, sensing potential electoral advantages—who wouldn’t want their country to be better defended?—former President Donald Trump has regularly pledged to establish an American equivalent of Israel’s “Iron Dome” system on the campaign trail. While the Iron Dome is specifically designed to address the types of threats Israel faces (such as rockets, drones, and cruise missiles), it does not adequately account for the advanced threats facing the U.S. homeland (including ballistic missiles, advanced cruise missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles). However, an American version could be crafted based on similar principles, employing a “layered” defense with various interceptors tailored for specific threats.
The current political climate, characterized by improved technology, escalating threats from adversaries, and a renewed U.S. political commitment, provides a unique opportunity to advocate for enhanced homeland missile defense—a movement reminiscent of President Ronald Reagan’s initiatives in the 1980s.
Many Americans may be unaware that the United States has abstained from developing ballistic missile defenses against China and Russia and has only limited defenses against cruise missiles, fearing such actions may trigger an “arms race” or lead to preemptive strikes during crises. Unsurprisingly, both Beijing and Moscow have taken advantage of this restraint, developing their own homeland missile defense systems and crafting military strategies that leverage the perceived vulnerability of the U.S. homeland.
If adversaries believe they can employ coercive strikes against the U.S. homeland without facing a credible defense—especially attacks that fall below the nuclear threshold—they may be more inclined to follow through with such threats. A weakened posture invites aggression.
The United States can no longer afford to deter its foes with one arm tied behind its back. Relying mainly on punitive threats without simultaneously denying enemies the opportunity to strike escalates the risk of conflict, potential escalation, and the damage done if deterrence fails.
While some critics acknowledge the deterrence advantages of an expanded and improved integrated air and missile defense system, they often contend that these systems must be flawless—essentially “leak-proof”—to justify expenditure. This is a flawed argument. The primary purpose of air and missile defenses is to raise the “price of entry” for an aggressor, compelling them to consider two daunting outcomes: failing to achieve their desired military and political objectives and provoking an unacceptable response from the U.S. Should deterrence fail, effective air and missile defenses can mitigate damage and help retain the capacity to respond appropriately.
Whichever candidate wins the presidency in November should acknowledge these strategic benefits and gradually increase the budget for homeland missile defense, aiming for an allocation of approximately 2% of the annual defense budget.
Short-term budget increases should focus on terrestrial, airborne, sea-based, and space-based sensors that can accurately assess the nature of the missile threat, aiding in the selection of appropriate interceptors. Former commander of U.S. Northern Command, Gen. VanHerck, has pointed out that “uncrewed, semi-autonomous” air and maritime sensors could provide advanced warning. Moreover, revamping “left of launch” strategies—interventions prior to an adversary’s attack—can bolster deterrence by instilling uncertainty in the minds of adversary military leaders regarding the efficacy of an assault.
In the long run, the United States should maximize its advantages over adversaries, including its robust market economy and strong alliances. The U.S. economy is technology-driven, and partnerships with allies are already proving beneficial in developing advanced missile defense systems. Nevertheless, further efforts are essential, particularly in the space domain and through the advancement of directed energy capabilities, to significantly reduce the cost per intercept—initially targeting unmanned aerial systems and eventually cruise missile threats.
Developing the capabilities needed to shield the U.S. homeland from coercive missile strikes will help deter conflicts both domestically and internationally, as adversaries must weigh not just the potential failure of their initial attacks but also their likely consequences—a worrisome dilemma from their perspective. Only through
