Much remains unclear regarding the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), particularly concerning its design, technical specifications, and overall costs. One notable aspect, however, is Saudi Arabia’s keen interest in joining forces with the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan to develop the next-generation fighter aircraft.
Saudi officials first expressed their aspirations for GCAP in 2023, citing economic and defense industrial motivations. They aim to localize segments of GCAP through manufacturing, technology transfers, and human capital investments. They emphasize that their goal is not a junior partnership, but rather an equal involvement where the kingdom has a significant stake in the program, aligning with its defense and economic ambitions.
However, while there are compelling reasons for the three GCAP nations to consider Saudi Arabia’s inclusion, there are fewer clear motivations for the Saudis to participate. A deeper examination of the leadership’s perspective in Riyadh is necessary.
From the viewpoint of the UK, Italy, and Japan, the inclusion of Saudi Arabia could provide significant advantages. The development costs of GCAP are anticipated to be substantial, particularly as it aims to outperform the fifth-generation US-made F-35 and compete with the sixth-generation programs from the United States, China, and the French, German, and Spanish FCAS initiative.
Thus, tapping into Saudi capital to reduce costs could accelerate aircraft development, shorten export timelines, and alleviate the financial pressures on the already stretched defense budgets of London, Rome, and Tokyo.
Furthermore, solidifying strategic ties with Saudi Arabia through GCAP is viewed as a prudent move. With its $925 billion sovereign wealth fund and ambitious goals in defense modernization, along with a $100 billion investment in artificial intelligence — a sector expected to significantly contribute to global economic growth — Saudi Arabia is seen as a rising geopolitical player.
Understanding the push for Saudi Arabia’s inclusion, it appears that London is the most active in advocating this participation, which aligns with its historical security ties with the kingdom. UK-Saudi relations date back to the early twentieth century, with the two nations cooperating closely on defense initiatives. The UK stands as Saudi Arabia’s second-most important security partner, providing vital military training, equipment, and advice.
However, persuading not only the British public but also the Italian and Japanese counterparts about the merits of Saudi inclusion might prove challenging. Tokyo, for instance, has voiced human rights concerns, although some analysts view this as a negotiation tactic to safeguard its industrial interests in the GCAP.
While Saudi Arabia may expect significant production opportunities if major financial contributions are made to GCAP, its expectations may need to be tempered. Any local production will likely focus on smaller components rather than substantial engine work that Japan is considering for the program.
The potential for Japan’s strategic gains must also be noted. Collaborating with Saudi Arabia, while reducing overall program costs through pooled resources, can strengthen ties within the Gulf and support a broader ambition to gain a larger market share in the sixth-generation aircraft space while decreasing reliance on the US for security.
A feasibility study regarding Saudi Arabia’s inclusion in GCAP was proposed by London in March 2023, although it either remains uncompleted or confidential. With internal consensus still lacking among the involved partners and in British politics, a defined timeline for Riyadh’s potential involvement in GCAP continues to be uncertain.
Despite these ambiguities, Saudi Arabia’s determination to secure commitments from the GCAP trio suggests a careful exploration of what benefits might arise from its public interest in the program.
The economic justification for Saudi Arabia’s involvement in GCAP, however, is questionable. Investing billions in aircraft development while facing restrictions to smaller-scale production may not present a compelling value proposition. Experiences gained by Saudi engineers in maintenance and modest service roles might not justify such significant expenditures.
Geopolitically, Saudi Arabia is acutely aware of the importance of its military ties with the UK and is continually seeking to enhance these relationships. Recent meetings during the World Defense Show in Riyadh reaffirmed such commitments, leading to cooperation on advanced capabilities encompassing air defense systems and unmanned aerial systems.
The challenge remains to ascertain how much more value Saudi Arabia would derive from joining GCAP, especially in light of longstanding ties with other major players. The strategic argument remains unproven, as current and future defense needs could be satisfied through fifth-generation aircraft and improved defense management practices aligned with the kingdom’s transformation plan.
Moreover, since GCAP is not projected to reach operational status before 2035, Saudi Arabia’s urgent need to upgrade its capabilities cannot afford such a lengthy wait, particularly with existing options like the F-35 available.
This context points to a more probable underlying motive for Saudi Arabia’s public expression of interest in GCAP: exerting pressure on the United States for the F-35 sale while also negotiating for a mutual defense treaty, which has been a topic of discussion in recent years.
If this strategic interaction with GCAP successfully prompts US leaders to approve the F-35, it would facilitate Saudi Arabia’s possible pivot away from sixth-generation aspirations, embracing a more established.