This year, Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified threats against his adversaries within the NATO alliance by lowering the threshold for a nuclear strike. This action directly followed Moscow’s accusations against the US for allowing Ukraine to use the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) artillery weapons inside Russian territory for the first time since the war commenced. Soon after, Washington publicly acknowledged that the policy to relax weapon restrictions was in place, after months of resistance to such calls.

Putin’s new nuclear doctrine, signed in November, explicitly stated that any non-nuclear power aligned with a nuclear state or receiving support from a nuclear state—effectively all 32 NATO members—would be considered targets if Russia perceives a threat.

William Alberque, former Director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Center, remarked in an op-ed for Breaking Defense that “In all, the new doctrine says that Russia will use nuclear weapons whenever the president decides to do so.” He elaborated, “But by expanding the role of nuclear weapons beyond deterrence, and by extending the dangers that could become threats—including military infrastructure or exercises near its borders—it risks sending ambiguous or non-credible deterrent signals that could, in turn, force Putin to act more aggressively to credibly deter the West.”

On the ground in Ukraine, another 12 months have passed, totaling over 1,000 days since the war began, with neither side able to deliver a decisive blow—although Russia has made slow advances. Kyiv has shown renewed resilience and ingenuity, most notably by executing a surprise incursion into the Kursk border territory, which reportedly involved the deployment of around 10,000 troops.

At that time, military sciences director Matthew Savill of the Royal United Services Institute considered this tactical gamble as Ukraine’s strategy to instigate debate within NATO regarding the possibility of conducting long-range weapon strikes inside Russia. However, it was only after North Korean soldiers were dispatched to Kursk that Washington finally chose to lift restrictions on long-range weapons that would enable strikes within Russian territory.

It is estimated that Pyongyang has sent approximately 11,000 troops to Kursk. Losses on the North Korean side, which were reported for the first time in December by Ukraine’s main defense intelligence agency, are said to amount to at least 30 dead or wounded in action, according to ABC News.

Europe’s initiatives to ramp up weapons production for Ukraine’s benefit and replenish equipment provided to Kyiv remain overshadowed by Russian industrial capabilities. Morten Brandtzaeg, CEO of Norway’s Nammo, suggested that attempting to compete directly with Russian artillery shell production is futile and that European industry would be better off focusing on quality rather than quantity. Nonetheless, he expressed reasons for optimism, noting that European production had made a significant leap forward over the past year, spurred by “separate nations” supporting “local industry” through government subsidies.

Brandtzaeg mentioned that Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Germany have all adhered to this approach.

As the year comes to an end, a major concern for European leaders is the potential threat posed by President-elect Donald Trump—not only due to the repercussions that could arise from the US halting military aid to Ukraine, a prospect he has mentioned, but also due to a peace plan that might remove Ukraine’s NATO membership from consideration. The rapid collapse of French and German governments in quick succession has further fueled fears that European unity on defense issues may suffer as a result.

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